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“The present danger is not one of unemployment
 due to lack of demand but one caused 
by lack of coordination of resources […]. 
In absence of an overall plan, this danger
 is likely to grow not diminish.”
Káldor (The Times, April 3, 1947)
Miklós Káldor1 and Jenő Varga were two influential advisers who had worked 
on establishing the three-year reconstruction plan that the Hungarian government 
adopted in July 1947. The first one, living and working in Great Britain, advised 
the Social Democratic Party (abbreviated as SZDP in Hungarian), while the sec-
ond one was living in Moscow and was asked to the help the Hungarian Com-
munist Party (abbreviated as MKP in Hungarian). Both visited Budapest in late 
1946 to advise the coalition government, in which both the Social Democrats and 
the Communists had ministers.2 
Having been a People’s Commissar of the Hungarian Republic of Councils in 
1919 and later on the Komintern’s leading economist, Varga’s reputation was al-
ready firmly established when he visited Budapest in 1945 for the first time since 
1920.3 In 1945, he was also Molotov’s adviser on matters of German reparation 
payments (Mommen 2011: 159–166). Hungarian-born Káldor, active in British 
politics, was a relative outsider. He had studied in England during the Great De-
pression and during World War II, he became close to Keynes and his theory 
of aggregate demand. It is less known that Káldor did show a personal interest 
in Hungarian matters already during the war. He was a member of the Angliai 
Magyar Tanács (Council of Hungarians in England), a united political organisa-
tion of Hungarian refugees living in Britain. This body was formed in April 1944. 
Members of this political organisation were, inter alia, Tamás (Thomas) Balogh, 
Károly (Charles) Polányi, and Mihály (Michael) Polányi (Borbándi 2006). 
The Social Democrats and the Communists agreed on the principle of prepar-
ing a state-led reconstruction programme for a thorough modernisation of the 
country. Káldor’s views did not differ that much from Varga’s. However, Varga’s 
great example was the Soviet economy, while Káldor’s plan was inspired by the 
1  Given the context of the present paper, we use the Hungarian accented spelling of Káldor’s 
name in the main text, but not in the reference section, where we follow the language of the 
original publications.
2  The coalition government included two other parties, the Smallholders (Független Kis-
gazdapárt, FKGP) and the National Peasants’ Party (Nemzeti Parasztpárt, NPP). The country’s 
first two prime ministers were both from the Smallholder party, a reflection of the election 
results.
3 Varga was in charge of the Ministry of Finance during the short-lived communist revolution.
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economic policy of the British Labour Party. Both advisers thought that a parlia-
mentary road to socialism was possible. For Káldor, the redistribution of income 
and wealth through a comprehensive welfare system based on the solidarity of all 
citizens was essential. For Varga, collectivisation and nationalisation remained 
the main objective for the vanguard party of the proletariat.4 
When arriving to Budapest in October 1946,5 Káldor joined a team of the Eco-
nomic Research Institute, who had to compete with a Communist draft worked 
out by Varga and his team. The two plans did not differ that much. Káldor’s one 
was even received with much respect by the Communists for its better quality 
(Thirlwall 1987: 104). 
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Right from the beginning of the new epoch, the Soviet Red Army played a promi-
nent role in keeping political order. For the Hungarian Communists it was now 
a matter of establishing their authority by implementing urgent economic and 
social reforms. Inter alia, Varga advised Mátyás Rákosi, the Communist Party 
chief and Deputy Prime Minister, on economic problems such as the repair of the 
railway system and financial and monetary problems. He wrote a memorandum 
on agrarian reforms too. 
The MKP was hoping to gain the electoral support of the working classes 
and the poor peasants. However, the results of the parliamentary elections of 
November 4, 1945 were disappointing for the Communists. The Smallholders’ 
4  Those readers who are familiar with the economic history of the post-war years, may recall 
that another prominent Hungarian economist, Professor István Varga (not a relative of Jenő 
Varga) also played an important role in the stabilisation programme (see Majoros 2000, 2003). 
[Editor’s Note] 
5  According to his own recollection that is often quoted in the Hungarian sources, he was in 
Budapest for two months in the December-January period (Kaldor 1979: 79). This is incorrect; 
the two-month continuous stay was probably an exaggeration. He was certainly in Budapest 
at the end of October because it is indicated in his first article in The Manchester Guard-
ian. A letter to the Editor appeared on November 19, 1946 in The Times. It seems that he 
was already back in London at that time. All together he had five articles published in The 
Manchester Guardian in the October-November period. The Communist plan was published 
on October 15. The Socialist draft was ready in late December. In early January, an SZDP 
commission was already discussing the party’s own draft. In the recollection of other con-
temporaries (Kemény, Dabasi-Schweng), there is no reference that Káldor had come again in 
(or stayed until) January 1947, although Ránki (1963) is certain that Káldor was present at a 
meeting on January 8. Interestingly, in the remaining part of the year, Káldor did not publish 
any other articles on Hungary than the ones in The Manchester Guardian. In sum, Káldor’s 
stay in Budapest is not sufficiently documented (Ránki 1963:70).
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Party obtained 57 per cent of the popular vote. With only 16 per cent of the vote, 
MKP finished as the third party just behind the SZDP. In order to re-establish the 
political equilibrium in the coalition, the two urban working-class parties formed 
a Left Bloc, which was extended to the National Peasants’ Party. From now on, 
Rákosi’s tactic consisted of purging the dominant Smallholders’ Party and the 
Social Democrats of their right wings. 
As inflation started to reach dangerous levels, already in February 1946, Varga 
advised Rákosi to balance the budget by imposing a strictly monetarist policy. In 
April 1946, he pleaded for a thorough monetary reform and cutting state expendi-
tures while increasing tax incomes. A monetary stabilisation plan was worked out 
by the Hungarian administration and the National Bank. In order to stabilise the 
exchange rate of the pengő (the Hungarian currency of the time), the government 
concluded separate agreements with Washington and Moscow. The monetary sta-
bilisation plan was implemented on August 1, 1946, together with the introduc-
tion of a new currency, the forint (HUF).
Fixed prices were combined with a strict deflationary monetary policy. The 
whole operation was also eased by the previous American declaration that the 
booty taken from Hungary by German and Hungarian Nazis, including the gold 
reserves of the Hungarian National Bank with a value of USD 2 million, would be 
returned. But no radical structural economic reforms were discussed. Monetary 
stabilisation was also largely dependent on trade recovery and the foreign loans 
the government tried to attract in combination with trade treaties. That was also 
Varga’s view (Varga 1946). He even lectured on these subjects for the masses in 
a Budapest football stadium and he then revealed that the Hungarian bourgeoisie 
had opposed a high devaluation rate of the national currency. 
Then, on Varga’s instigation, an economic recovery plan was worked out by a 
team of Communist economists led by Ernő Gerő. He was assisted by economic 
specialists such as István Kossa (National Bank), István Friss, László Háy, and 
Zoltán Vas.6 
PREPARING AN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION PLAN7
Although not all monetary difficulties had disappeared with the introduction of 
the new currency, confidence in the forint was soon established. Inflation re-
mained relatively low. However, state intervention through the awarding of con-
6  Gerő, Friss, Háy and Vas belonged to the Moscow faction of the Hungarian Communist Party, 
therefore they were natural allies of Varga.
7 For a detailed historical account of events in English, see Brus (1986).
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tracts and allocating materials in combination with credit financed by the state 
created an insatiable need for more governmental loans as long as the private 
banks could not mobilise enough savings. This was still one of the main sources 
of inflationary pressure. The reparation payments (about 7 per cent of the national 
income) and heavy occupation costs would also be a source of inflation. In ad-
dition, the state had to keep the nationalised sector afloat. All mines had been 
nationalised. In January 1946, the Supreme Economic Council was formed with 
the task of securing efficiency in economic management by allocating raw mate-
rials and bank credits the commercial banks were unable to allow. In the summer 
of 1946, special bureaus were created for the administration of textiles, timber, 
wood, iron, etc. in order to streamline production, and for the purchase and al-
location of strategic raw materials as well as finished and semi-finished products. 
In coal mining, all free-market operations were forbidden. In November 1946, 
the five largest firms in heavy industry8 were brought under state supervision. 
These firms now operated as trusts fulfilling production targets set by the govern-
ment. About two-thirds of their output went to the state at low prices. Hence, one 
could also speak of a “gradualist strategy”, making the state the majority share-
holder of many enterprises without officially nationalising them (Berend – Ránki 
1985: 182–188). 
The Communist plan was attentively studied by a team of 30 Social Demo-
crats assisted by Miklós Káldor (Kemény 1952: 23). Within six weeks, they pub-
lished their own plan, which was even more ambitious than the Communists’ 
(see Table 1). Both development plans were very daring as they also proposed to 
increase productivity in industry as a precondition to the creation of abundance. 
Piece wages and Stakhanovism would become the standard in industry (Kornai 
1950). Meanwhile, the Communists tried to refine their planning proposals per 
economic sector. Therefore, they installed commissions for industry, agriculture, 
foreign trade, finance, transport, communication, cooperative associations, so-
cial policy, and culture.9 In December 1946, the government announced that an 
overall Three-Year Plan would be outlined (Gerő 1947; 3 éves terv 1947). Gerő 
established a commission in which members of the different coalition parties pre-
pared a final draft of the reconstruction project. These members were the SZDP 
(György Kemény, László Faragó, and Artúr Székely), the Communists (Zoltán 
Vas, István Antos, and György Markos), the Smallholders (Sándor Gönczy, Jenő 
Rácz, and Artúr Kárász), and the National Peasants (Imre Kovács and Lóránd 
Dabasi-Schweng). 
8  Ganz Villamossági Részvénytársaság, Ganz-MÁVAG, Rimamurány-Salgótarjáni Vasmű, 
Weiss Manfréd Művek and Győri Vagon- és Gépgyár. See Government Decree 23.500/1946.
9 Memorandum signed by I. Friss, October 15. Party Archives, 274 f. 12/l00.
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The Communists and the Smallholders clashed on several planning issues in 
the commission. In a speech given by Gerő on January 11, 1947, at the Central 
Committee, he called his colleague Jenő Rácz “a Horthyst bourgeois economist”.10 
By then, Minister of Finance Rácz was replaced by Smallholder Miklós Nyárádi. 
The Communists remained the driving force of the special commission. Leading 
the Planning Bureau was now their ambition. After spending the war in Brussels 
as an undercover agent of the Komintern, Andor Berei had returned to Budapest 
in early 1946; he was now in charge of all planning tasks.11 
Together with the founding of a new central planning body, the three-year plan 
was adopted in July 1947. The ambition was to achieve, by 1949, an increase of 
about 17 per cent in the national income, exceeding the 1938 level. How to fi-
nance this ambitious plan was still a problem. The Social Democrats, but also the 
Communists, were hoping for foreign loans. At that time, the Hungarian govern-
ment had joined the other Central European countries in applying for participat-
ing in the Marshall Plan. Finally, the Soviet Union forbade the Central European 
countries to participate in the Marshall Plan. On August 1, 1947, the Three-Year 
Plan providing for a state-directed economy went into effect (Kemény 1952). 
KÁLDOR’S VISION ON POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
As already mentioned, Káldor, along with Varga, was the main inspirer of the 
Three-Year Plan. It is, however, difficult to trace their individual contributions 
to the discussions within their respective political parties. We know much about 
Varga’s views because they were published in pamphlets and journals. Káldor 
published a series of articles in The Manchester Guardian in October and No-
vember 1946, in which he commented on the situation in Hungary. He also sent 
10 Party Archives, 274 f. l2/l02.
11 Memorandum signed by Berei, May 9, 1947. Party Archives, 271. 12/107.
Table 1. The Three-Year Reconstruction Plan – GDP forecasts 
Name of the partys 1938 1946/47 1947/48 1948/49 1949/50
Million HUF
SZDP 23,376 14,806 17,755 21,383 24,823
MKP 23,376 12,000 15,200 18,000 21,200
Percentage
SZDP – 100.0 119.9 144.4 167.7
MKP – 100.0 126.7 150.0 177.5
Source: Judik (1947: 7).
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a letter to The Times in defence of his appreciation of the situation in Danubia. In 
these articles, his evaluation of the economic situation was rather optimistic and 
he defended the government’s foreign policy of signing trade agreements with 
the Soviet Union.
During World War II, Káldor published his Keynesian views on post-war re-
construction and the British welfare state in the press (Kaldor 1947). In general, 
these views were perfectly in line with the post-war economic and social policy 
of the Hungarian government. In his pamphlet Economic Reconstruction after 
the War (1942), Káldor argued for economic and social reforms after the war. 
A return to pre-war unemployment should be avoided by state intervention in the 
economy. After World War I, economic controls had been abolished too quick-
ly. Hence, “post-war reconstruction”, he argued, “required an equally swift and 
large-scale transfer, only in a different direction. The system of war-time controls 
is therefore just as necessary for the return to peace-time economic conditions as 
for war” (Káldor 1942: 11). 
Káldor’s Keynesian conclusion was that “it all comes down, finally, to the size 
of consumers, purchases, and to what the business men expect these purchase 
to be in the future” (Kaldor 1942: 18). The government had to fix maximum 
prices so that the most competitive firms could survive and grow. “It would at the 
same time prevent that monopolistic exploitation of the consumer which we usu-
ally associate with the domination of the market by large and efficient concerns. 
The Government’s war-time policy with respect to utility, clothing and furniture 
shows how much could be done in this direction” (Kaldor 1942: 22–23). At the 
end of his paper, Káldor also argued that this method of forcing industries to sell 
at truly competitive prices – and at prices at which only the efficient, and not the 
inefficient firms can survive – is the only one by which capitalism could be made 
work. “It is the only method of allowing full scope for the economies of large-
scale production without creating powerful monopolists whose very existence 
endangers the stability of the state. The alternative solution is socialism: for the 
state to take over production directly and to plan production units at their most 
efficient scale” (Kaldor 1942: 23). 
The tone of this pamphlet was optimistic. Káldor argued that the economic 
situation of Britain was less disastrous than commonly believed. In addition, he 
defended the idea that rationing and price control could eliminate inefficiently 
producing firms. The allocation of raw materials and finances should be allowed 
according to well-defined basic needs. Import controls had to secure the most 
important imports and with capital flows regulated, nationalised key industries 
could gain economies of scale (Thirlwall 1989). 
In 1943, Káldor published (together with J. Robinson, A. A. Evans, E. F. Schu-
macher, and P. Lamartine Yates) the pamphlet Planning of Abundance distributed 
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by the National Peace Council. Robinson wrote in defence of the Beveridge Re-
port that it advocated the “mildest and most reasonable” reforms (Kaldor 1943: 
6) on abolishing unnecessary poverty by means of public works, controlling 
prices, national investment. Again, Káldor defended the Beveridge Plan, but 
now by stressing its economic implications and he rejected all objections against 
it. Transfer expenditure did not reduce the amount of consumables available to 
the community, “but merely re-distributes it between different persons” (Kaldor 
1943:23). In addition, Káldor also rejected the silly idea that the Beveridge Plan 
would impose a heavy burden on industry. That would only be the case if the plan 
were to reduce productivity. Tibor Barna confirmed Káldor’s theory in a study 
that employers’ contributions raise prices, not only by the amount of the tax, but 
in proportion to the increase in prime costs caused by it; for exactly the same 
reason for which a general rise in wages is likely to be followed by a proportion-
ate rise in prices (Barna 1945: 99). Káldor could observe that phenomenon in 
Hungary when he was staying there. Hence, several of Káldor’s Keynesian ideas 
contained in these two pamphlets were later incorporated into the economic and 
fiscal reforms implemented by the Hungarian government. 
KÁLDOR’S ARTICLES IN THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
Káldor’s articles published in The Manchester Guardian in October and Novem-
ber 1946 give us a good idea of his analysis of the situation in Hungary.12 He was 
amazed by the fact that monetary reforms had brought inflation down and “the 
hordes of money-changers, speculators, and black marketers, which filled the city 
to overflowing, disappeared by a gust of the wind”. The citizens of Budapest even 
found an atmosphere that recalled the long-forgotten days of the early 1930s. 
There were now plenty of goods in the shops, but no buyers. Cafés and clubs 
(brothels) were closing down. According to Káldor, Hungary and Greece experi-
enced a major inflation of “the classic German type”. The thesis of the League of 
Nations experts that once an impoverished country falls prey to a major inflation, 
it could not get out of it “without substantial financial help from abroad”, proved 
to be wrong. Hungary introduced the forint without any foreign help (unless the 
return of the National Bank’s gold from Germany be regarded as such), while the 
country was making reparation payments on a very heavy scale. If the Hungarian 
experiment succeeds, he wrote, “many of the accepted ideas about the causes and 
cures of inflations” needed revising (Kaldor 1946e). 
12  It is less known even among Káldor specialists that an article on this subject was published by 
him in The Economic Journal as well. (Kaldor 1946g) [Editor’s note] 
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According to Káldor, the original cause of the Hungarian inflation was the 
complete breakdown of economic controls at a time of extreme scarcity. He also 
pointed to the fact that the Hungarian war-time controls were introduced only 
half-heartedly, and that the rationing system was never extended beyond a few 
staple foods. After liberation by the Russians, the administrative machinery was 
virtually non-existent and encouragement was given to private trading to provide 
the cities with foodstuffs. So all restrictions were cancelled and there followed 
four months of complete laissez-faire. The result was that the population sur-
vived, but the cost of living had meanwhile risen 15 times the previous leve1. 
A 15-fold increase in prices was, however, the maximum that the available cur-
rency in circulation could support. In the summer of 1945, the improvement in 
the food situation was sufficient to offset the effect of newly-printed notes and the 
rate of increase in prices had slowed down. But in autumn, the government had 
to extend very large credits to industry. At the same time, the trade unions made 
an attempt to establish “some automatic relation between wages and the cost-of-
living index and to raise money wages at least to some recognisable fraction of 
the pre-war real wages” (Kaldor 1946e), which made the acceleration of inflation 
“inevitable”. In this period, there was also “an enormous increase in officials of 
all kinds”, both in public and private offices, as well as of wage-earners doing 
purely unproductive work. “The scaling down of all these unproductive employ-
ments, particularly the dismissal of hordes of unnecessary officials, is perhaps 
the most painful after-effect of the inflation”, Kaldor (1946e) argued. He also sig-
nalled that wages had lost all relation to the value of the work done. Real wages 
consisted of the calorie minimum paid according to the number of dependents 
and quite independently of the amount of work performed. Hence, the “usual 
incentives to efficiency” were lacking (Kaldor 1946e).
According to Káldor, the basic idea behind the stabilisation plan was that the 
currency system could only be kept stable if the various classes were prepared to 
accept an income which was no greater than the money value of the real goods 
and services that could be made available for them. A consistent price, wage, and 
salary structure was regarded as “the first requirement of a genuine stabiliza-
tion scheme” (Kaldor 1946f). A balanced budget was a second necessity, while 
adequate gold backing was a third necessity. However, this last condition had 
“a purely symbolic significance”. It was regarded necessary that the new cur-
rency should be generally perceived as being sound by the population. When 
the Americans returned USD 32 million of gold the Nazis had removed from 
Hungary and kept in Frankfurt, the Minister of Finance elaborated plans for a 
balanced budget. Hence, the Supreme Economic Council started negotiations for 
the creation of a consistent wage and price structure. Settling the price and wage 
system in one collective contract was a new feature of the Hungarian stabilisa-
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tion scheme. Káldor (1946f) reported that in May 1946, the Hungarian govern-
ment, “largely on the initiative of the Communist members, began to take steps 
in all three directions in order to establish a sound currency in time for the new 
harvest.” Hence, the first task was to estimate the real national income for the 
coming year and the proportion that was available for consumption. The level of 
wages and salaries, and house rents were now settled as percentages of pre-war 
incomes and prices. One estimate set Hungary’s national income at 60 per cent 
of her pre-war income. In view of the reparation payments and reconstruction 
expenditures, the average of income payments was fixed at 50 per cent of the pre-
war rate, payable if output per head in the factory reached 75 per cent of pre-war 
production, with appropriate increases for higher productivity. The rate for sala-
ries was fixed at 35–42 per cent and house rents at 40 per cent of pre-war levels 
for small dwellings and 60 per cent for larger ones.
Another important step was the fixing of wheat prices at 400 forints per ton 
or 2.2 times the pre-war “pengő” price. Other agrarian and industrial prices were 
fixed by taking wheat prices as a standard. For agricultural prices as a whole, the 
coefficient was 2.7 and for industrial prices 4.4. Industrial prices were fixed so 
high in relation to agricultural prices to ensure that the people in the towns should 
be fed for no more than they could afford in terms of manufactures. In the future, 
these high prices might be gradually reduced. The new currency, the forint, was 
converted so high in terms of gold that the free market prices for gold and dollars 
fell steeply. In no time, the National Bank gathered 10 million dollars in dollar 
notes, which business firms and individuals were compelled to surrender in order 
to acquire forints. Next, the prices of manufactured goods fell by some 10 per 
cent from the initial level. The black market in foodstuffs vanished as soon as the 
peasants surrendered their grain to the governmental offices.
After this monetary operation, inflation suddenly vanished. Foodstuffs ap-
peared in the market “as if by magic and were offered at or below official prices; 
the black market in foodstuffs vanished”; however, Kaldor (1946f) also signalled 
two main problems in this period: shortage of credit and the necessity of main-
taining a balanced budget. Business credits were granted only within very narrow 
margins, for working capital purposes. As long as the budget deficit was not re-
moved, the government remained very chary in releasing credits to industry. Kál-
dor thought that the new tax rates would be adequate for securing the 1,800 mil-
lion forint tax revenue provided for the stabilisation plan and that the danger was 
more on the expenditure side. About 100,000 state officials were nonetheless 
dismissed. He also noted that on a total expenditure of 2,100 million forints, some 
750 million forints had been set aside for reparation payments and the costs of 
the Soviet army of occupation and the allied missions in Budapest. Káldor also 
criticised the fact that the Russians had made heavy demands and communicated 
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them only one month ahead. The three Allied missions were amounting to about 
a third of the total costs of the Red Army at the time. Hence, the government was 
hoping for a speedy conclusion of the peace treaty. Káldor was rather optimistic 
about the “real” effects of the currency stabilisation now that the factories spoke 
of considerable improvements in efficiency. On the other hand, unemployment 
was still high in the building industry. Káldor even foresaw a critical period at the 
end of the year, when the currency in circulation would reach saturation point. 
Only if state expenditures could be fully covered by taxation by then could a last-
ing stabilisation be successfully accomplished. Then, the way would be open for 
a “renewal of long-term investment” (Kaldor 1946f).
Having visited Austria as well, Káldor could compare the situation in Vienna 
with that in Budapest. In contrast to Budapest, he reported, Vienna was an “oc-
cupied city” having only recently emerged from fighting. There were few shops 
and cafés open. In Budapest, the rubble had mostly been cleared away. While 
in Vienna the black market was still the main topic of conversation, in Buda-
pest the black market was over. “But more important perhaps than any of these, 
the oppressive atmosphere of the occupied town, which hangs over Vienna in 
much the same way as over the cities of Germany, is almost completely absent 
in Budapest.” The behaviour of the Russian troops had radically changed for the 
better in the last six months, all requisitions and industrial removals had ceased, 
and the occupation authorities intervened to a minimum extent in local affairs. 
Laws passed by Parliament were no longer submitted to the Allied Control Com-
mission’s approval. On Russian insistence, the land had been distributed to the 
peasants, a radical measure which was only contested by the Conservative Right 
and the Catholic Church. Moreover, the “elimination of the class of feudal land-
owners and of the traditional bureaucracy from their position of power and influ-
ence amounted to a social revolution whose permanent consequences will prove 
far more significant at present,” but it was the Russian occupier, rather than the 
“internal forces of the revolution”, which were to be held mainly responsible 
(Kaldor 1946b).
Káldor had observed that the local party system suffered from two impor-
tant defects, which would later be confirmed by historical studies (Palasik 2000; 
Mevius 2005; Kenez 2006; Vida 2008). Firstly, the political parties had acquired 
masses of new members “who either had no political convictions or experience 
at all” and whose “political sympathies were most unreliable.” Secondly, the six 
parties offered a wide selection of political outlooks, but “they did not really 
command the support of important sections of the public”. The Communists and 
Social Democrats commanded the allegiance of the industrial working classes 
and the National Peasants’ Party appealed to the landless peasants. The Small-
holders represented the small farmer with 10 to 30 acres. The latter were in favour 
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of the division of the large estates, but they would have much preferred to see 
the land divided among the deserving small farmers than to see it given away to 
the landless day labourers. The two liberal parties of the Western pattern had no 
wide following “outside the (now largely depleted) Jewish middle classes” of the 
towns (Kaldor 1946c). The Conservative and Catholic interest groupings were 
not represented in Parliament from which the Fascists were also excluded. Hence, 
the Smallholders could obtain 57 per cent in the last elections thanks to the votes 
of the submerged parties of the Right. This lack of a Right in Parliament was, 
according to Káldor, “a serious mistake”, which could lead to an unhealthy po-
litical atmosphere and which could retard the country’s democratic development. 
Káldor (1946c) also noted that the right-wing voters were steadily pushing the 
Smallholders’ Party to the right. The Catholics and other reactionary groupings 
had a “large but undefined influence over the strongest party in government”, 
which left them “with far more room for manoeuvre” than they would have as 
an open Parliamentary opposition. Communists and Socialists, he argued, would 
certainly not be opposed to the creation of a Catholic party, but the group around 
Cardinal Mindszenty was unwilling to back this project.
Káldor mentioned that according to the Armistice Agreement, Hungary had to 
pay reparations to the amount of USD 300 million of 1938 purchasing power, of 
which USD 200 million were payable to the Soviet Union and USD 100 million 
to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The agreement stipulated annual instalments of 
USD 50 million a year. A new agreement was then negotiated in lengthening the 
period of delivery to eight years. The Hungarian-owned share in the Transylvanian 
coalmines of Petrozsény was set off against reparations claims. Hence, the amount 
of deliveries was fixed at some USD 22 million for the initial period, rising to 
USD 45 million in 1949. About 25 per cent of the current factory production, or 
15 per cent of all industrial production, with 60 to 70 per cent of the output of the 
iron, steel, and engineering industries, was now going to the Soviet Union. Káldor 
(1946d) also estimated that about 5 per cent of industrial equipment had already 
been taken by the Russians as “war booty”, which was not credited as reparations. 
Under the Potsdam Agreement, the Soviet Union was entitled to acquire all 
(pre-war) German property in Hungary, or 5-8 per cent of factory production. 
Among these firms was the originally Austrian-owned Danube Steam Navigation 
Company, which also owned the coalmines around the city of Pécs. Joint-stock 
Soviet-Hungarian companies were created in shipping, aviation, bauxite, and oil 
production. Under a Soviet-Hungarian trade agreement, the Soviet Union deliv-
ered to Hungary some USD 20 million worth of raw materials. Barter agreements 
on a smaller scale were also signed with the Scandinavian countries, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland, and France. Hence, Káldor (1946d) con-
cluded that “both as regards direct participation in Hungary’s industries and as 
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regards foreign trade, Russia will have much the same importance for post-war 
Hungary as Germany had in the interwar period.” However, Germany was then 
only interested in buying foodstuffs and selling industrial products, while the na-
ture of the trade with the Soviet Union was the reverse. He did not expect that the 
development of the trade with Russia would mean the reduction or elimination 
of Hungary’s trade with the West. The Russian connection would instead assist 
Hungary’s industrialisation. In addition, Hungary could also develop other food-
stuffs than cereals, such as poultry and eggs, while in the sector of the machine 
tools, machinery parts and other manufactures the country would largely depend 
on imports from the highly industrialised countries of Western Europe.
Káldor’s optimistic forecasts for Hungary’s economic and political develop-
ment were certainly not shared by many opinion-makers. Rather negative arti-
cles on the situation of Hungary were published in The Times. As usual, Kaldor 
(1946a) sent a letter to the editors protesting against their one-sidedness. He re-
futed the assertion that the trade agreement Hungary had signed with the Soviet 
Union was extremely unfavourable. Hence, financial stability and trade with the 
Soviet Union would hasten economic reconstruction, while trade with the Soviet 
Union bypassed trade with the countries of Western Europe. However, the trade 
balance showed an important deficit as well.
THE THREE-YEAR PLAN
The Three-Year Plan launched on August 1, 1947, aimed at raising Hungary’s na-
tional income to a level higher than before the war. Investments eliminating bot-
tlenecks were given priority (Jelentés 1948). The main debatable issues were the 
share of agriculture in investments and the necessity of long-term foreign loans. 
The Social Democrats reckoned with relatively greater investments and tried to 
keep investments in agriculture even lower than did the Communists (Schweng 
1952: 9). In the course of its execution, the plan was modified several times. After 
the first five months, a special drive was organized in order to quicken the pace so 
that the targets of the Plan could be achieved by December 31, 1949. Each estab-
lishment or factory was required to appoint a plan agent reporting on what progress 
had been made. An Investment Bank was set up in order to replace the commercial 
banks and became the cashier of the Planning Bureau. The central bank, obtaining 
special powers, was from now on the banker of the nationalised industries.
Already in the beginning, the right-wingers of the Smallholders’ Party were 
visibly no longer accepting predominance of the “Marxist parties” in govern-
ment. The discovery of a “conspiracy” concocted by some leading Smallholders 
prepared the ground for a rift in the government. Rákosi succeeded in having a 
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group of right-wingers arrested and others expelled from Parliament. The Small-
holders’ Party broke into pieces and Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy resigned from 
office before new elections were held. Hence, the Parliamentary elections on Au-
gust 31, 1947, brought a victory for the Communists as the defenders of the social 
revolution. With 22.5 per cent of the total vote, the Communist Party came first, 
preceding the Social Democrats and the Smallholders. The four-party coalition 
obtained 61 per cent of the vote, but this time, the Communists could clearly 
dominate the other parties when pushing for more radical economic reforms. 
Meanwhile, the Cold War was already under way. George Marshall’s Har-
vard speech on June 5, 1947, promising reconstruction credits to any European 
country that applied made it clear that Washington would refuse any new bilat-
eral financial accord. Only a package deal obliging the European countries to 
coordinate their policies was acceptable. In the meantime, the Soviet leadership 
still believed in a possible advantageous arrangement with Washington. Hence, 
Varga defended the Communist thesis that the primary purpose of the Marshall 
Plan was to forestall, or at least mitigate, the worst effects of the coming overpro-
duction crisis by seeking new markets in Europe. Varga argued that because the 
Marshall Plan was largely driven by economic necessity, it would be possible to 
exploit this need for its own ends. At this stage, the Soviet leaders wanted to en-
sure that the countries which had suffered most from German aggression would 
obtain priority for receipt of US credits. Hence, Stalin urged the political leaders 
in Warsaw, Prague, and Belgrade to work out a programme. The Hungarian gov-
ernment was also interested in the American project. In the end, all went wrong at 
the Paris Conference meeting on June 26, 1947, and the Soviet delegation left the 
French capital. Varga now argued that the Marshall Plan tried to bring the Eastern 
European countries into the orbit of American influence. The Eastern European 
countries should thus refuse American aid. For the Hungarian Social Democrats, 
this refusal was a painful reverse as they were looking for foreign loans in or-
der to finance investments. Their position in government was now considerably 
weakened, but they nonetheless refused to repudiate their alliance with the Com-
munists. Apparently, there was no alternative. Breaking with the Communists 
would imply civil war and a return of the Right in government.
By March 1948, nationalisations embracing all companies with more than 100 
employees as well as the public utilities and banks were completed. By May 
1948, 20 directorates of the various branch ministries were set up to adminis-
ter the nationalised industries. By now, the civil bureaucracy had been already 
purged and politicised to the point where the staffs of governmental agencies and 
offices headed by non-Communist ministers were no longer responsive to their 
nominal chiefs without Communist assent. The point of no return was reached 
when, in early 1948, the Communists asked the Social Democrats to merge into 
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one big workers’ party. The westernising faction led by Minister of Industry Antal 
Bán opposed this move to the left and quit. With other expatriated Social Demo-
crats, he then founded a Hungarian Socialist Party in exile. A unification congress 
was nonetheless held on June 12–13, 1948, which gave birth to the Hungarian 
Workers’ Party. On February 1, 1949, the Hungarian Popular Front for Independ-
ence – an umbrella organisation of coalition parties – was created by the Commu-
nists, which obtained 96 per cent of the popular vote in the elections on May 15, 
1949. Meanwhile, all other political parties had already been banned. The pace of 
economic reforms was now speeded up (Vas 1950). In June 1949, the Council of 
National Economy took over the role of the Supreme Council of Economy, and 
on August 20, 1949, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Hungary was 
proclaimed. A Five-Year Plan of a Stalinist model was launched on January 1, 
1950, but this time under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
CONCLUSION
The dictatorship of the proletariat can be seen as the logical outcome of a process 
the Communists had been striving for after 1945. With the decisive help of the 
Soviet Union, they had steadily reinforced their position in all state institutions 
and they had succeeded in absorbing the leftists in the Social-Democratic Party 
and driving out the moderates. A “third road” to socialism without authoritarian 
planning imagined by the Hungarian Social Democrats did not exist. No other po-
litical or social forces were available at that moment to form a reformist coalition 
government of a Western type. The “Kaldorians” were then hoping for foreign 
loans to speed up the process of economic recovery, but this hope soon vanished. 
Stalin and the Hungarian Communists saw the Marshall Plan as Washington’s at-
tempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the European countries. 
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